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theory of action |
first: 2011-10-12 |
Philosophy of action, also indicated as theory of action, covers a range of
philosophical activities with a growing interest, stimulated by recent
results in neurosciences and by discussions on free will. The basic principle common to all
causal theories of action is that:
[t]he agent performs an action only if an appropriate internal state of the
agent causes a particular result in a certain way. [Davis 2010: 32]
Wayne A. Davis observes that there is a distinct difference between
agent causation and event or
state causation. This refers to a
variety of views. To summarize these views very briefly: agent causation
makes use of the concept of agent intention, in which intention usually is
formed by the combination of beliefs and desires. With the
event- or
state causation approach the agent intentions are not the main
interest. Others' views put emphasis on the agent as a complete entity.
[Davis 2010: 32-34]
In parallel, a significant discussion in theory of action is focused on the so
called physicalism issue. Although it is not the focus of this section, when
causality is discussed this issue can not be completely neglected.
Physicalism claims that the actions of physical objects can be completely
explained in terms of physical causes and laws. The position that assumes
that the same `mental state' is related to the same physical state is
usually called
type identity. The position I take in this essay is
that the mental states such as
beliefs and
desires are higher
level functional identifications of states and processes that actually are
activations of neurological instances. At a low level certain actions indeed
can be explained by detailed neurological processes (see example in appendix
2). However, the actions of designing functional artifacts are far too
complex to be worked out at a detailed neural level. If this would at all be
possible, it would require large computer facilities. But, large computer
facilities have a similar problem, it will not be possible to follow at low
circuitry, bit level what really happens. To perform the same function they
will not act in exactly the same way at low level. This last remark can
easily be demonstrated by a simple example. This text typed with a
particular pc running Microsoft OS compared with an other type pc will
generate the same text in a different way. This position is usually called
token identity. (For some more information and a survey of
references on this issue see e.g. Davis 2010) However, the output
string of bytes to the printer would be identical (type identity), assuming
the pc is configured in the right way. It is the so called
printer
driver programme that transforms into the required output. With human
beings we can see this programming process taking place. Just after birth
infants see their own arms moving almost at random, gradually they program
their neurons to act according to their will. ("Will" is here meant not in
an ontological sense, but just as a higher level of action control.)
The leading paradigm knowing is acting is also most relevant in the
analysis of design activities. It has been worked out most explicit by Dewey. In
the theory of inquiry he defines as the first step the institution of a
problem:
A problem represents a partial transformation by
inquiry of a problem situation into a determinate situation. It is a familiar
and significant saying that a problem well put is half-solved. (Dewey 1938: 173)
The transformation is a combination of conceptual thinking in the direction of
solutions and the actual knowledge of the factual situation. This transformation
is followed by testing the considerations and judgments made.
[Dewey1938a}:173-179)