This section clarifies the basic structure of reasoning in the other
sections and adds some remarks about and justifications of the chosen
methodology.
The section How Designers Work gives a short analyses of the development of artifacts
in order to define a reference model for design processes as the basis for
further analyses. This includes the use of the notion use plan as
introduced by Houkes and Vermaas. Then the way of working of designers is
analysed with the role of required capabilities.
Exploring the cognitive processes related to design runs in basic
restrictions. The main problem is that we, human beings, are quite
restricted to analyse our own cognitive processes. As among others Thomas
Metsinger explains, this is fundamental because the brains evolved to act in
the fastest and most efficient way to survive. Monitoring how the brain
works internally would not contribute to survival, in contrary, it would
slow down operational processes and cost extra energy.
[Metzinger 2009]
Three different approaches to analyse the cognitive processes can be
considered, as summarized below.
Observation of capabilities
Nancy J. Nersessian summarizes, with various references in her
contribution for The Cognitive Basis of Science, three different
methods to be distinguished in the analysis of the cognition processes of
Science. [Nersessian 2002] The same distinction seems to be applicable
in the cognitive oriented analysis of artifact design.
1. In vivo studies are studies based on observations in natural
settings. For the study of real breakthrough scientific discoveries this
would be just luck when such a study project would coincide with such a
discovery. The same is true for real breakthroughs in design. In both cases
smaller steps can be observed by anyone, preferably with an understanding of
the design aspects. Such as one of the team members with an eye for such
processes. Some examples are given in
example: semiconductor development
2. In vitro studies try to analyse the capabilities required for
design activities in specific test environments. The number of reports is
quite limited, but Donald Schön describes an
interesting example as will be summarized in
How Designer Work.
3. Sub specie historiae analysis tries to catch the basic cognitive
processes by analysing historical developments. As she mentions, underlying
the use of the cognitive historical method is a continuum hypotheses.
[Nersessian 2002: 135] This hypotheses assumes that the cognitive
practices employed in science (and in technology), did not change over time
and these are extensions of the kind cognitive practices humans employ in
coping with their environment and problem solving of a more ordinary kind.
The example sections give examples of transitions in historical developments of some functional
artifacts.
Although the possibilities to analyse the basic cognitive process are
limited, the examples appear to be useful to support the analysis of action
causality made in section causal factors
Observation of incapabilities
In a way the observations of limitations and incapabilities are
the most valuable because they can be very useful to identify specific
functions that cannot be easily identified as subfunctions of complete
functional capabilities. Two kinds of incapability situations can be
distinguished: innate- and trauma caused incapabilities.
Examples of innate incapabilities are mentioned with the
observation mentioned by Donald Schön and in the
examples of semiconductor developments with the example
of analog circuit design and with the example of the functional digital
design. Unfortunately these examples have not been analysed in more detail,
they only give a rough indication of the missing capability.
More details are available in some examples of the trauma caused
incapabilities, because in case of the change caused by trauma, the missing
function is more clear and subject of medical, neurological investigations.
Among the best known examples are the ones analysed and published by Antonio
R. Damasio such as that of Patient Elliot. As this one concerns a
capability that is also essential in design processes it will be taken as a
main example in section How designers work.
Empirical neuro scientific evidence
A completely different approach is not based on the observation of
capabilities but on views of the neural processes. New measurement methods
already did yield information about cognitive processes while monitored by
functional-MRI brain scans. Results of these methods probably will increase
our understanding of design processes in futere.
The section causal facors analyses the causation aspects of action theory applied
on design actions. The historical concept of causation will be reviewed. In
the area of design actions the currently common meaning of causation, the
mechanical causation as Hume identified with one billiard ball colliding
with an other, falls short in explanation power for theory of actions in
general and even more specific in understanding design processes. The
versatility of causal concepts derived from Aristotle's four causations will
be illustrated with a couple of examples mainly from two distinct domains,
namely design of agricultural - and electronic artifacts as described in
example sections. The model of causation, could be based on
evidence, namely the results of the design processes as these can be
observed with real artifact developments and interpreted as causal factors.
That does not imply that these causes can always really be one to one
related and reduced to basic mental (neural) states/processes yet, if at
all.
It goes beyond the scope of this sections to work out the similar causal
factors and cognition processes of animals like chimpanzees and elephants
when they select and even adapt the size of a stick, respectively tree
branch for a certain purpose. Other interesting examples could be found with
nest building of birds and bevers. The basic shape concepts might be innate,
but the birds and the bevers have to select and judge the material for its
purpose.
As will be concluded:
Pragmatism and Phenomenology can form a consistent, partly
complementary, base for cognition oriented philosophical analysis in this
case of the design of functional artifacts.
There are fundamental limitations to get a reductionist
understanding of the mental processes, different methods and views have to
be combined, in a pragmatic phenomenological analysis to improve the
understanding of design processes.
